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Introduction
The age of interactive video on demand (VOD) is nearly upon
us.1 Several communities.across the country have already served as
test sites for the new technologies that will provide VOD. 2 While the
1. Video on demand technologies will allow consumers to download entertainment and
educational programming directly into their homes. See infra note 10. The technologies will offer
several advantages over traditional methods of receiving entertainment and educational
programming, the primary advantages being convenience and increased choice. See infra notes
21-32 and accompanying text. Numerous different technological approaches for distributing and
receiving such video programming are either currently available, or likely to be so in the near
future. See Robert Corn-Revere, New Technology and the First Amendment: Breaking the Cycle
of Repression, 17 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 247, 249-51 (1994). It is possible to distribute the
programming over fiber optic telephone cable, existing cable-TV cable, satellite transmission,
and microwave transmission. Id.
VOD can also be delivered over hybrid fiber/coaxial cable architectures. See Michael R.
Niggli & Walter W. Nixon, III, A Serendipitous Synergy: Why Electric Utilities Should Install the
Information Superhighway, 7 ELECTRICITY J. 26, 29 (Feb. 1994). This opens up the field of VOD
delivery to utility companies as well as phone and cable companies. See id. A number of tests
have been run using such an architecture. See Steven R. Rivkin, While the Cable & Phone
Companies Fight . . . Look. Who's Wiring the Home Now, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1993, §6
(Magazine), at 46. Telephone companies, including Pacific Bell and Ameritech Corp., are also
establishing hybrid fiber/coax setups for VOD delivery. See Lewis H. Young, Exploring the
Interactive Market: Confusion, Confusion, Confusion, ELECTRONIC Bus. BUYER, Dec. 1, 1993,
available in 1993 WL 2954662.
It may also be possible to provide VOD over existing twisted pair telephone wiring using
high speed modems and compression/decompression technology, though at present the
compression/decompression technology is not sufficiently sophisticated. Telephone Interview
with Peter Ham, Software Engineering Manager for Sybase, Inc. of Emeryville, California (Mar.
1, 1996) [hereinafter Telephone Interview with Peter Ham].
VOD actually comes in two forms: (1) Pure VOD; and (2) near VOD (NVOD). Telephone
Interview with Peter Ham, supra note 1. The difference between the two primarily has to.do with
bandwidth requirements. VOD is essentially point-to-point communication between a publisher
(service provider) and a customer. Because it is point-to-point, VOD greatly increases the need
for bandwidth. NVOD, by contrast, is point to multi-point between the publisher and several
customers. Consequently, less bandwidth is required. Id.
2. The following communities have served, or are about to serve, as test sites: Fairfax
County, Virginia; Orlando, Florida; Montgomery County, Maryland; Baltimore, Maryland;
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Virginia Beach, Virginia; northern New
Jersey; Cerritos, California; and Denver, Colorado, with many other installations well into the
planning stages. See Mike Mills, Bell Atlantic to Expand Video on Demand Test, WASH. POST, Jan.
23, 1995, at F3; Paul Farhi, Wiring up Washington, WASH. POST, July 4, 1994, at Fl; Paul Farhi,
Bell Plans Interactive Video Service in Six Markets, WASH. POST, May 20, 1994, at F2; John
Lippman, 'TV of Tomorrow' Is a Flop Today, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 1993, at Fl; Paul Farhi &
Elizabeth Corcoran, Interactive in Orlando, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 1994, at Al. Sybase, Inc., of
Emeryville, California, is one of the leading software developers for interactive television (ITV)
systems. See Sybase Technology Demonstrated to Senate Commerce Committee, M2 Presswire,
Dec. 11, 1995, available in 1995 WL 10872541. Sybase ITV software has been used in ITV tests in
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technology is still far too expensive for broad-based consumer use,3 it
is likely that most communities will have access to these services
within the next decade or so.' Despite the glowing promises of
convenience and increased choice offered by video on demand, this
portion of the information superhighway may be fraught with
troublesome moral and policy issues. The new technologies are certain
to refocus a contentious moral and legal debate about pornographic
communications. 5 Because the new technologies will combine audio
Singapore, Hong Kong, Connecticut and Georgia. Telephone Interview with Peter Ham, supra
note 1.
3. According to Ed McCracken, chairman of Silicon Graphics, Inc., of Mountain View,
California, the technology is still "at least ten times too expensive." Quoted in Farhi & Corcoran,
supra note 2, at Al (quoting Ed McCracken).
4. Id.
5. Pornography and new media technologies often go hand in hand. And where
pornographers go, prosecutors and legislators are sure to follow. On July 28, 1994, Robert and
Carleen Thomas, a married couple from Milpitas, California, became the first persons to be
convicted for distributing pornography over the Internet. See David Landis, Sex, Laws &
Cyberspace, USA TODAY, Aug. 9, 1994, at Dl.
In addition to federal prosecutors, Congress and the President have recently gotten into the
act. On February 8, 1996 President Clinton signed into law the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996). This massive piece of legislation (710 pages), the
primary purpose of which is to deregulate the American telecommunications industries, includes
a section (Title V, section 501 et seq., amending title 47 U.S.C. section 223) entitled the
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA). The CDA, sponsored by Senator Jim Exon (D.
Neb.), is meant to respond to the perceived "problem" of indecent and obscene communications
on the internet.
Furthermore, the federal government has not been alone in attempting to regulate the
transmission of pornography via new technologies. Numerous states have enacted regulations in
this area, and many more are in the process of doing so. In January, 1996, "the New York State
Legislature passed a bill that would penalize the transmissi6n of indecent material to minors
using a computer system." Legal Matters: Battle Over "Cyberporn" Moves to State Level,
INTERNET WEEK, Feb. 5, 1996, available in 1996 WL 7055470. Nine states (Connecticut, Georgia,
Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Montana, New Jersey, Oklahoma and Virginia) had passed such laws
by early 1996. Leslie Miller, State Laws Add to Net Confusion, USA TODAY, Feb. 5, 1996, at 6D.
Four others (Maryland, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Virginia) have such statutes pending.
See Legal Matters: Battle Over "Cyberporn" Moves to State Level, supra. At present, it is not clear
to what extent the CDA may preempt these state provisions. "'The federal pre-emption is not
very strong in [the CDA],' [says] Steven Cherry of Voters Telecommunication Watch. Thus,
instead of one law, [internet] users may have to contend with many at once." Id.
Finally, in addition to the state and national laws, there is "a patchwork of individual
countries' laws to deal with." See Miller, supra (quoting America Online attorney William H.
Burrington). The effect of other countries' pornography laws on U.S. citizens was illustrated in
December, 1995, when CompuServe, in response to pressure from German authorities
prosecuting a Bavarian pornography case, announced that it was blocking access to more than
200 sexually-explicit Internet newsgroups. See James Coates, CompuServe Yields to Demand for
Limitation; Germany Opposes Explicit Newsgroups, CHI. TRIu., Dec. 29, 1995, at 1; Tom Abate,
Access Denial Alarms On-Line Users; CompuServe Action Widely Lamented, S.F. EXAMINER,
Dec. 30, 1995, at Al.
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and video with interactive capabilities, this debate will likely be far
more intense than that which centered on the dial-a-porn industry in
the 1980s.6
Just as the development of mass announcement systems via "976"
numbers in the early 1980s7 fostered the development of the phone sex
industry,8 new technologies that allow video on demand, and
particularly interactive video, are likely to generate a potentially
lucrative new forum for the sex trade. Unlike the mere audio
transmissions available on traditional phone systems, the new
technologies will offer services combining aspects of phone, video, and
cable TV communications.9 The home entertainment center of the
not-too-distant future is likely to offer viewers an electronic, menu-
controlled interface through which individuals can access various
programs for viewing from a variety of archival databases.1' If the
marketplace alone is to control, these services will include programs
and services specializing in erotica.11 As with other technological
CompuServe quickly backtracked on this act of censorship; in February 1996, CompuServe
"reinstated all but five of the original groups that were suspended." Jared Sandberg, CompuServe
Reinstates Most of Groups on Internet It Suspended in Recent Ban, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 1996, at
B12. CompuServe simultaneously announced that it would provide its subscribers with free
"software that could be employed to selectively block any material the user finds offensive."
Peter H. Lewis, An On-line Service Halts Restriction on Sex Material, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1996,
at Al.
6. For a good review of the debate centering on dial-a-porn, see Heidi Skuba Maretz,
Note, Aural Sex: Has Congress Gone Too Far by Going All the Way With Dial-a-Porn, 11
HASTINGS CoMMJENT L.J. 493 (1989); Cindy L. Peterson, Note, The Congressional Response to the
Supreme Court's Treatment of Dial-a-Porn, 78 GEO. L.J. 2025 (1990).
7. See Maretz, supra note 6, at 497.
8. See Theresa M. Sheehan, Note, A Post-Sable Look at Indecent Speech on the Airwaves
and over the Telephone Lines, 15 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 347, 347-48 (1993); Christian A. Davis,
Comment, Revisiting the Lurid World of Telephones, Sex, and the First Amendment: Is This the
End ofDial-a-Porn?, 2 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 621, 621-22 (1993).
9. See Corn-Revere, supra note 1, at 260-62; see generally ITMIEL DE SOLA POOL,
TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 23 (1983).
10. "[A] switched video network will expand the possibilities for diversification of
programming ad infinitum. [Regional telephone companies] will be able to offer individual
viewers a potentially infinite choice of programming that can be ordered at any time. The viewer
will simply dial a computer data bank, and the program will be delivered over the network to the
viewer's home. Infinity will replace scarcity." Note, The Message in the Medium: The First
Amendment on the Information Superhighway, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1062, 1082 (1994) [hereinafter
The Message in the Medium]; see also infra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
11. The demand for pornography, while ever-shifting in focus, seems to be consistently
growing. See generally Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The Pornographic State, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1374 (1994); see also Barry W. Lynn, "Civil Rights" Ordinances and the Attorney
General's Commission: New Developments in Pornography Regulation, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 27, 30 (1986). Thus, it seems only natural, given generally accepted laws of economics, that
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developments that have produced new fora for the dissemination of
erotica, the marketplace will not be the sole player in determining
availability. Government, at all levels-local, state, federal, and
international-will inevitably play a major role.'2
The combination of these new technologies with pornography
raises important legal issues implicating the First Amendment'3 as well
as the privacy and autonomy rights of consumers.14 Traditionally, the
law has drawn distinctions both between obscenity and indecency, as
well as between the levels of First Amendment protection provided to
the various media.16 This Note will analyze the current state of the law
which relates to services which are analogous to those offered by the
new technologies. It will recommend appropriate steps that can be
taken to effectively regulate these new technologies while
simultaneously protecting the First Amendment rights, as well as the
privacy and autonomy interests, of viewers and service providers.
Section I will outline the capabilities of the developing technologies in
regard to pornographic communications. Section II will provide
background concerning the relevant law in this area, with a primary
the supply will meet the demand in as many different forms as the demand takes. Many
marketers in the field of VOD "believe that pornographic films will be the medium that first
makes interactive TV profitable." See Young, supra note 1. "'I think there will be quite a big
market for it,' said Diana Hawkins, of Interactive Associates, a Portola Valley, Calif[ornia]-based
consulting firm. 'Interactivity is a compelling concept, and it's certainly a powerful fantasy tool, if
you can get it when you want it."' Amy Harmon, Slip into Some Sexy Software That Isn't Made of
Silk or Satin, Hous. CHRON., Dec. 5, 1993, at C14. Rod Richardson, vice president of Market
Strategies of Atlanta, which conducted a 1993 study on parental attitudes towards pornography
and the internet, "figures that in the early days of 500-channel interactive TV, as much as half the
programming will probably be pornography." Charles Davidson, Will Porno TV Rule
Information Highway?, ATLANTA Bus. CHRON., Dec. 31, 1993, available in Westlaw, Allnews
database 1993 WL 6764168.
12. See Landis, supra note 5. With the development of the Internet, it is also important to
realize that the regulation of pornography can no longer be considered purely a local, state or
national concern. The Internet allows for world-wide inter-connectivity, and thus for relatively
fast and easy inter-continental traffic in pornography. This opens the door to attempts at inter-
continental prosecution of pornographers.
13. See Jerome A. Barron, The Telco, the Common Carrier Model and the First
Amendment-the "Dial-a-Porn" Precedent, 19 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 371, 371-77
(1993); John C. Cleary, Note, Telephone Pornography: First Amendment Constraints on Shielding
Children from Dial-a-Porn, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 503, 512-16 (1985).
14. See Cleary, supra note 13, at 517-19; Lynn, supra note 11, at 113-14.
15. See generally FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
16. See Corn-Revere, supra note 1, at 249-52; The Message in the Medium, supra note 10, at
1069-88; John V. Edwards, Note, Obscenity in the Age of Direct Broadcast Satellite: A Final
Burial for Stanley v. Georgia(?), A National Obscenity Standard, and Other Miscellany, 33 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 949, 979-88 (1992).
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focus on dial-a-porn and pornography-as-prostitution cases. Section
III will outline the general arguments for and against increased
regulation of pornography. Section IV will analyze how the new
technologies fit the existing legal doctrine, and will also briefly analyze
how the recently enacted Communications Decency Act of 1996 fits
into the broader legal doctrine. This Note will conclude by suggesting
that the new technologies themselves may provide the answers to
many of the concerns that traditionally have led to efforts to restrict
the dissemination of pornographic communications; it will also suggest
that privacy and autonomy interests-rather than the more traditional
First Amendment focus-may represent the most compelling
argument against aggressive regulation of electronically-disseminated
pornography.
I
Outline of the New Technologies
Video on demand can be provided by a variety of different
apparatus.17 Regardless of the physical apparatus that is the selected
means of transmission, the various delivery systems are likely to share
many similar characteristics.18 Of significant relevance to this
discussion, most delivery systems will be capable of providing
sophisticated blocking and selection services to allow consumers both
a choice of programming and the ability to restrict access to certain
programming options." Of equal relevance, the new technologies will
offer a truly sophisticated level of interactivity.2°
17. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Farhi & Corcoran, supra note 2. Most delivery systems will allow, at a
minimum, a simulation of VCR technology. They will, for example, allow replay, stop, fast-
forward, etc. See also Corn-Revere, supra note 1, at 249-51.
19. To the extent that the new technology allows consumers to select from archival
databases, the current world of network and cable television will be dramatically altered. Much
as home computer users select from software and CD-ROM packages, entertainment consumers
of the near future will be able to select programming packages and limit their universe of
entertainment to the options that they have selected. The tests of VOD technology that have
been performed using Sybase's software technology indicate that VOD will support a wide
variety of entertainment choices, including videos, TV re-runs, and numerous other options.
Telephone interview with Peter Ham, supra note 1. These choices have been made available to
test-site viewers through the use of a graphical-user-interface involving an on-screen (TV)
display with text, icons, and realistic pictures, accessed through a hand-held remote control
device. Id.
To the extent that the new technologies will mimic aspects of current telephone or cable
system technologies, consumers will be able to block or screen out unwanted programming. See
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 18:869
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The most promising technologies, in the long-run, will be those
offering viewers the greatest freedom of choice.2 These will more
closely resemble what one finds on the personal computer systems of
today than what one finds on current TV networks and cable
systems." Consumers will be able to buy or rent not just the
programming options,' but the individual programs that they most
desire.' A viewer who wishes to watch only certain episodes of Monty
Python's Flying Circus or Saturday Night Live, for instance, will be
able to use an on-screen menu to select particular episodes from an
archival database,' and download them in a matter of moments. 2
When combined with blocking and selection technologies, such a
menu system will make for a vastly different viewer than today's
average couch potato. Rather than taking what is given, tomorrow's
cyber-viewer will be able to comprehensively select what is available
for his or her household. Those viewers who, for example, wish to
restrict access to premium movies or erotic video will be able to:
generally The Message in the Medium, supra note 10, at 1080-85; Allen S. Hammond, IV,
Regulating Broadband Communications Networks, YALE J. ON REG. 181 (1992).
Such blocking technology has already found a home on the Internet. At least four software
programs are available that allow parents to block or screen undesirable internet sites: Net
Nanny, Surfwatch, Cybersitter and Cyber Patrol. Ian Haysom, Computer Program Turns Parents
into Internet Censors, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Feb. 15, 1996, at C6. Blocking devices have also been
made available for Sybase's ITV tests, through, for instance, the use of personal-identification
numbers (PIN's). Telephone Interview with Peter Ham, supra note 1.
Parents also can control the VOD content available to their children by making their PIN's
unavailable to their children, or by selecting different PIN's for various service providers, and
only making available to their children the PIN's that the parents feel are appropriate. Id.
20. See The Message in the Medium, supra note 10, at 1081-83.
21. Bruce Ryon, an analyst for Dataquest, Inc. in San Jose, California who has studied
consumer demand in this area, observes: "People want control of what comes into their
homes, . . . [t]hey want to control what they see and what is entertaining them." Young, supra
note 1.
22. One possible model for the home entertainment interface of the near future is the
personal computer graphical user interface (GUI) (e.g., an Apple Macintosh or PC running
Windows). The GUI model is the basic approach taken by Sybase. See supra note 19.
23. For example, cable channels.
24. See Hammond, IV, supra note 19, at 190-91. ("Consumers within a particular group,
class, race, industry or religious sect can have their own programs, mini networks, and data bases
specifically designed to meet their needs, beliefs, and interests.") (referring to M. ETHAN KATSH,
THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAW 103 (1989)). This is no longer merely
theory. Such choices have already been made available to consumers in various test markets. See
supra note 2; infra note 32.
25. Either via a computer screen or TV screen, depending upon the technology that is
employed. (There is an ongoing debate as to which platform-TV or computer-will ultimately
dominate the ITV market.) See Young, supra note 1.
26. See The Message in the Medium, supra note 10, at 1082.
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(1) have the movies available, but choose to "lock them out" at
particular times or for particular users;' or (2) choose not to have the
movies available at all. 8 Such options will be particularly popular with
parents who wish to limit their children's viewing options in order to
economize or to insure that the children do not watch "inappropriate"
programming.2
Another important and related characteristic that will be shared
by these new technologies is interactivity. 0 The mere act of selecting
from a menu-based archival database of entertainment (and other)
programming, of course, represents a degree of interactivity. Beyond
this level, however, lie more sophisticated strata on which the
consumer will be able to interact with others and with the technology
itself. One basic example of a semi-sophisticated level of interactivity
is video-phone technology, which is currently available in several
markets.31
As these technological advances progress, it is certain that
purveyors of sexually-explicit materials will be included within the
milieu of electronic publishers seeking an audience in this brave new
interactive world. 2 Sexually-oriented works that are-and will be-
disseminated over the new communications media range from the not-
even-indecent-by-virtually-anyone's-standard to the obscene-by-even-
the-most-liberal-First-Amendment-supporter's-standards.
In short, just as the development of Mass-Announcement-
Services (MAS) telephone system technology in the 1980s led to a
burgeoning of the Dial-a-Porn trade, interactive VOD technologies
will inevitably lead some publishers to use these new technologies to
satisfy the demand for pornography33 by providing on demand video
27. This could be achieved in numerous different ways, including the use of PIN's,
passwords, voice-recognition systems, finger-print ID's, or more traditional forms of parental
supervision.
28. See Hammond, IV, supra note 19, at 190-92.
29. On the issue of parental concern over their children's television viewing diet, see
Peterson, supra note 6, at 2025-27.
30. See supra notes 10 and 19.
31. The video-phone may be the most obvious example for interacting with others; as for
interacting with the technology itself, the most obvious example may be interactive video games.
32. In fact, interactive erotica is already available online. In February 1996, a San
Francisco-based entrepreneur began running an advertisement for an internet-based "nude video
conferencing with your own stripper" service. See S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 23, 1996, at D15
(advertisement).
33. See supra note 11; Lynn, supra note 11, at 30; Lori Douglass Hutchins, Pornography:
The Prosecution of Pornographers Under Prostitution Statutes-A New Approach, 37 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 977, 977-78 (1986).
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 18:869
19961 VIRTUAL PROSTITUTION
porn' as well as more sophisticated pornographic services.- Because
these new technologies will necessarily involve a blurring of the
traditional categories of information providers,36  and because
pornographic publishers are certain to seek access to these potentially
lucrative technologies, this Note will next examine the existing legal
doctrine in related areas in order to develop a framework for
analyzing what an appropriate legal and regulatory response to these
nascent problems should look like.
II
A Brief History of the Laws Relating to Pornography
A. Pornography in General
The United States has vast experience in regulating-and often in
attempting to prohibit-pornographic communications.' Efforts have
been made at both the state and federal levels, and have involved
administrative agencies, courts, legislatures, and executive branch
committees. As Lori Douglass Hutchins has pointed out, such efforts
can be broken down into several broad categories: (1) obscenity
statutes; (2) public nuisance laws; (3) zoning ordinances; (4) civil rights
legislation; and (5) laws dealing with pimping, pandering, and
prostitution.A8
The rationales put forth for all these varied efforts at restricting
pornography have been multitudinous.39 For some, the primary
34. To begin with, the services offered may not differ much from what is offered on pay
cable currently, such as the Playboy Channel.
35. The services that will be technologically feasible are likely to be extraordinarily
comprehensive, and will include, among other things, a merger of the video phone technology
with the dial-a-porn economic mentality to create a potential for-at one extreme level-an
online voyeuristic dial-a-prostitute service. See, e.g., supra note 11. Under such a system, a
pornography consumer will be able to dial a video phone dial-a-porn service and request that the
actors and actresses who answer engage in particular sex acts for the caller to watch.
But that will not represent the only type of service available. Other examples would be: (1)
private (not for profit) video phone "sex" between consenting adults; (2) downloaded
pornographic movies and still images; (3) virtual sex games and simulations (See, e.g., Susan Etta
Keller, Viewing and Doing: Complicating Pornography's Meaning, 81 GEO. L.J. 2195, 2203 & n.39
(1993)); and (4) sex therapy workshops. The above list is speculative and far from
comprehensive.
36. See Corn-Revere, supra note 1, at 260-62; see generally DE SOLA POOL, supra note 9.
37. See Lynn, supra note 11, at 27-37; Hutchins, supra note 33, at 978-88.
38. Hutchins, supra note 33, at 978-94.
39. See infra Section III.
argument is the protection of minors.'° For others, the primary
concern is the exploitation of women.41 Still others are concerned
about the problem of urban blight that often accompanies porn
emporiums.42 Some have articulated a concern that pornography leads
to crimes of violence.43 Lastly, there is a generalized concern about the
negative impact of pornography on society's overall structure of
morality.'
Whatever the reasons that are put forward, the net result of all
the regulations, statutes, and case law in the area of pornography is a
haze.4' The Supreme Court has been willing to extend some
protection, usually based on First Amendment concerns, to producers
and consumers of pornography, but that protection has often been
severely limited. 6
The general standard for pornography, as articulated by the
Supreme Court, is that indecent communications are protected under
the First Amendment,47 whereas obscene communications are not.4
40. See, e.g., Enforcement of Prohibitions Against the Use of Common Carriers for the
Transmission of Obscene Materials (Notice of Inquiry), 48 Fed. Reg. 43,348, 43,349 (1983);
Davis, supra note 878, at notes 622-23 nn.3-6; see generally Cleary, supra note 8.
41. This can be broken down into at least two sub-concerns. First, the civil rights of women
as a population. See generally Catherine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech,
20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1985); CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 172
(1987); Andrea Dworkin, Against the Male Flood: Censorship, Pornography, and Equality, 8
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1985); GLORIA STEINEM, OUTRAGEOUS ACTS AND EVERYDAY REBELLIONS
230 (1983); Sheila J. Winkelman, Making a Woman's Safety More Important Than Peep Shows: A
Review of the Pornography Victims' Compensation Act, 44 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 237
(1993). Second, the actual exploitation of the individual women who engage in pornography. See
Arnold H. Loewy, Obscenity, Pornography, and First Amendment Theory, 2 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 471, 482-85 (1993); Winkelman, supra, at 247 n.69 and accompanying text.
42. See Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 n.8 (1973); Loewy, supra note 41, at
485-87.
43. In July, 1991, Senator Mitch McConnell introduced the Pornography Victim's
Compensation Act, S. 1521, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991); see Winkelman, supra note 41, at 248
nn.70-71 and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., Gianni P. Servodidio, The Devaluation of Nonobscene Eroticism as a Form of
Expression Protected by the First Amendment, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1231, 1255 (1993); see generally
Collins & Skover, supra note 11.
45. See generally Loewy, supra note 41.
46. Id. at 493.
47. See Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)("Sexual expression which
is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment. ... )
48. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Miller established the following test,
commonly referred to as the "community standards" test, for determining whether a given
communication is obscene: "(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community
standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
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Distinguishing that which is obscene from that which is indecent can,
however, be difficult. The Supreme Court, in Miller v. California,49
established a shifting standard of relativity for determining what is
obscene: that which is considered obscene, and thus not
constitutionally protected in one community, may not be considered
obscene, and therefore may receive constitutional protection, in
another.' Thus, an individual's constitutional rights in the area of
sexually-oriented communications depend in part upon the local
community in which that person engages in the act of disseminating or
receiving that communication.51 As a consumer of erotica, one's
constitutional rights further depend not just upon the community in
which one is consuming, but also upon the exact location within that
community.' For example, the Supreme Court held in Stanley v.
Georgia53 that one cannot be prosecuted for viewing an obscene
publication if it is done in the privacy of one's own home.' 4
defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Davis, supra note 8, at 626 (quoting Miller, 413 U.S.
at 24) (citations omitted). As E. Edward Bruce has noted, however, the Supreme Court's
articulation of a constitutional law of obscenity truly began with Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568 (1942), a case that actually involved no obscenity-or at least no sexually-oriented
materials. Chaplinsky was a "fighting words" case. But the Chaplinsky Court, in dicta, listed
other words, including the "lewd and obscene" that, like fighting words, go beyond the protection
of the First Amendment because they "are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality." E. Edward Bruce, Comment, Prostitution and Obscenity: A Comment Upon the
Attorney General's Report on Pornography, 1987 DUKE L.J. 123, 124 (1987) (quoting Chaplinsky,
315 U.S. at 572).
49. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
50. Id., at 24. It is interesting that the Constitution, which is supposed to apply equally to all
U.S. citizens, would, in this one particular area, provide unequal rights and protections to citizens
depending upon the particular community in which they happen to be communicating. It seems
antithetical to the very nature of a written constitution that it could possibly be interpreted to
support such a theory of relativity of rights.
51. Under this standard, one would generally expect to have greater constitutional rights in
San Francisco's Tenderloin district than one would in a small Southern Bible Belt town,
regardless of whether one were the publisher or consumer of the sexually explicit materials.
52. See, e.g., Movie & Video World v. Board of County Comm'rs, 723 F. Supp. 695 (S.D.
Fla. 1989) (upholding ordinance which required that doors be removed from video "peep show"
booths); cf. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)(upholding privacy right of individual to
possess and view obscene publication in the privacy of his own home).
53. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
54. Id. at 559. Note that Stanley, much like Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), rested
substantially on vaguely articulated constitutional privacy and autonomy interests. Stating the
majority opinion in Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565, Justice Marshall wrote:
Whatever may be the justifications for other statutes regulating obscenity, we do not
think they reach into the privacy of one's own home. If the First Amendment means
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Whereas obscene publications receive no constitutional
protection, indecent publications are protected by the First
Amendment, though they are not absolutely free from regulation. Of
course, it should be clear that one has no way of knowing for certain,
ahead of time, whether the sexually-oriented product will offend the
community's sense of morality so as to make it obscene. In order to
find out whether the product is obscene (or merely indecent) one may
have to wait for a decision from a group of twelve of one's peers.
This problem of waiting for judgment by the community will
become more urgent when the technology of dissemination advances.
For example, when one is operating a nude dance club in a particular
community, it may seem fair for the community to have input as to
whether such an establishment violates the community's standards of
decency.55 But when the technology you are dealing with involves the
dissemination of information from a centralized database, wherein
consumers from various different communities dispersed across the
country (and around the world) actively select the sexually-oriented
materials from the database, the relevancy of community standards is
far more tenuous.' Nevertheless, the standards that have been handed
down by the Supreme Court remain in force, and it is important to
realize that those standards have been applied even where there has
not been a close fit to reason. 57
Jurisprudence touching upon obscenity and indecency cuts too
broadly for this Note to comprehensively cover. But even a cursory
examination of the decisions reveals two overarching concerns
articulated time and again by the courts: a concern for the interests of
minors,' and a concern with the "nuisance" aspects of pornography.59
anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own
house, what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional
heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds.
Note also that the same voyeur who was exonerated in Stanley might legitimately be held liable
for violating the obscenity statutes if he can be caught in the act of purchasing the obscene
communication at a porn shop, through the mail, or over the internet. See supra note 5 and
accompanying text.
55. It may also seem fair to inquire into the issues of appropriate zoning, etc. On the other
hand, it may not seem so fair to the private property owner whose livelihood is at stake.
56. See The Message in the Medium, supra note 10, at 1078-81, 1083-87.
57. For instance, in United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971), the Court upheld a
conviction for mailing obscene materials to adults who had consented to receive the materials. In
United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels, 413 U.S. 123 (1973), the Court went even further, holding that
a consenting adult consumer had no right to receive obscene materials in the mail, even for
viewing in the privacy of the home.
58. See Cleary, supra note 13, at 521-28.
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These two concerns are well-illustrated by the case of FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation.60
In Pacifica, the Supreme Court held that indecent speech is
entitled to constitutional protection, but that such speech may
nevertheless be regulated due to the state's compelling interest in
protecting minors from exposure to indecent materials. 61 The Pacifica
decision corresponded with the Court's long-held recognition that the
state has a "compelling . . . interest in protecting minors from
offensive expressions of speech in an attempt to provide for their
physical and psychological well-being." 62
Furthermore, much of the indecency regulation has been based
on nuisance doctrine.' Nuisance doctrine has been particularly
applicable to pornography which is likely to impact minors.' Thus, the
FCC, "in an effort to avoid airing potentially indecent broadcasts at a
time when children may be in the audience,"65 has made provisions to
"channel the airing of such broadcasts to the late evening hours." The
FCC's efforts have been based primarily on nuisance doctrine. 66 As
Theresa M. Sheehan has noted, given certain circumstances or
contexts, the law of nuisance seeks not to prohibit particular offensive
activities, but instead "to regulate or control [them] by limiting [them]
to certain times of the day or night in an effort to accommodate those
who wish to engage in the activit[ies], as well as those who are
inconvenienced or disturbed by [them]." '67 This is precisely the
59. See infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
60. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
61. Id. at 749-51.
62. Sheehan, supra note 8, at 351. For cases dealing with what constitutes harm to children
so as to amount to a compelling governmental interest, Sheehan lists the following: New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
63. See Hutchins, supra note 33, at 983 n.49 (quoting McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669,
679 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("This Court has acknowledged the value . . . [of nuisance
statutes to] the vexing problem of reconciling state efforts to suppress sexually oriented
expression with the prohibitions of the First Amendment.")).
64. Thus, the Pacifica Court quoted Justice Sutherland's opinion in Euclid v. Amber Realty:
"A 'nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place,-like a pig in the parlor instead of
the barnyard . . . .We simply hold that when the [FCC] finds that a pig has entered the parlor,
the exercise of its regulatory power does not depend on proof that the pig is obscene" Pacifica,
438 U.S. at 750-51 (quoting Euclid v. Amber Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926)).
65. Sheehan, supra note 8, at 352.
66. Id.
67. Sheehan, supra note 8, at 352-53 (citing Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 731-33). As Sheehan
further notes, even after the FCC announced guidelines in 1987 for regulating indecent radio
broadcasts-updating the old "Seven Dirty Words" test-the "FCC continued its reliance
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rationale applied by the Pacifica Court in upholding the FCC
regulations.'
B. Dial-a-Porn Cases
The dial-a-porn industry blossomed in the early 1980s.6 It was
both immediately financially successful7' and instantly controversial.71
Soon after its inception, Congress responded to widespread
complaints against the industry, and attempted to regulate dial-a-porn
via restrictive legislation. 2 Congress' approach was to make it "a
crime to communicate directly, or by recording, any obscene or
indecent message for commercial purposes to anyone under eighteen
years of age,"' 7 but to provide "a defense to prosecution if the
provider restricted minors' access to its messages in accordance with
FCC procedures."'74 The FCC implemented the Congressional scheme
by promulgating regulations to "function as 'safe harbor defenses' for
dial-a-porn providers."'75 Under the FCC regulations, dial-a-porn
providers had two options for avoiding criminal liability: (1) they
could restrict their services to the hours of 9:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m.; or (2)
they could require credit card payment for the transmission of the
sexually-explicit messages.76 The first restriction was directed at
recorded MAS dial-a-porn messages; the second to sexually oriented
live commercial telephone communications.7 The FCC reasoned that
children were less likely to have access to such services during the
listed hours, and also less likely to have access to credit card
numbers.78
on ...nuisance theory, concluding that broadcasts falling within the new [more generic]
definition of indecency would only be actionable at a time of day when there was 'a reasonable
risk that children may be in the audience."' Id. at 353-54. For further information on nuisance
and channeling, see Loewy, supra note 41, at 485-90.
68. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750-51.
69. Sheehan, supra note 8, at 355.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 355-56; see also Federal Communications Commission Authorization Act of 1983,
Pub. L. No. 98-214, § 8(a), 97 Stat. 1469, 1469-70 (1983) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 223
(1994)).
73. Sheehan, supra note 8, at 355.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 355 n.53.
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The Second Circuit reviewed the FCC regulations in three
separate cases (the "Carlin Trilogy" ---Carlin I,' Carlin II,' and
Carlin 111P) brought by Carlin Communications, a large and successful
dial-a-porn company.' The court concluded that the FCC regulations
amounted to content-based restrictions "because they did not apply to
all 'dial-it' services, but only those delivering indecent messages."'
Thus, the court applied strict scrutiny, requiring that the government
show that its "content based" regulations were not merely the product
of a compelling governmental interest, but also that the restrictions
were the "least restrictive means" to further such a compelling
interest.85
In Carlin I, the court struck down the FCC regulations that
imposed "time channeling" because such regulations were not
sufficiently necessary or "narrowly tailored."' The court concluded
that time channeling "did not further the Government's compelling
interest because the regulations denied adults access to the service
during certain hours, but the opportunity remained open for children
to call these numbers during the hours in which access was
available."' Furthermore, the court concluded that time channeling
did not satisfy the "least restrictive means" test, and instructed the
FCC to examine other regulatory approaches, such as blocking and
access codes. 8
In Carlin II, the court rejected the FCCs regulatory requirement
which mandated that adult callers to dial-a-porn services obtain access
codes or make payment by credit card prior to obtaining access to
those services.' The court held that it was not the least restrictive
means available for regulating the dial-a-porn providers, reasoning
that since the technology necessary to implement an access code
system was not feasible at the time, such a regulation might drive the
79. Id. at 356.
80. Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 749 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1984) (Carlin I).
81. Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 787 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1986) (Carlin I).
82. Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 837 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 388 U.S.
924 (1988) (Carlin III).
83. Sheehan, supra note 8, at 356.
84. Id. at 357.
85. Carlin 1, 749 F.2d at 121.
86. Id. at 122-23.
87. Sheehan, supra note 8, at 357.
88. Carlin I, 749 F.2d at 122-23.
89. Carlin I, 787 F.2d at 856.
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dial-a-porn providers out of business. 90 The court ordered the FCC to
"further investigate the feasibility of a blocking system." The court
also rejected the viability of requiring decoding devices for scrambled
messages, finding that such a requirement would constitute an "unfair
burden" on adult consumers who wished to access the dial-a-porn
services, since the consumers would have to bear the cost of the
purchase and installation of the descrambling devices.'
The FCC's regulations finally passed the Second Circuit's strict
scrutiny test in Carlin III. In Carlin III, the court upheld the FCC
regulations which "maintained the access code and credit card
provisions, but [which were] amended to include two additional
defenses: message scrambling and billing notification."'  The court
held that the new regulations "did not unreasonably restrict adult
access and that the compelling government interest in protecting
minors could not, at this time, be served by a less restrictive means." 94
The court did, however, direct the FCC to "consider other possibly
less restrictive means of regulating dial-a-porn, such as beep-tone
devices' or blocking schemes, if and when they became
technologically feasible." 96
In 1988, as a response to the Carlin III decision, Congress
amended the Communications Act of 1934 by rewriting section 223
(the Telephone Decency Act), updating the regulations upheld in
Carlin L'. 7 The new version of section 223 did not distinguish
between communications that were obscene and those that were
merely indecent; instead, it imposed an across-the-board ban on all
for-profit dial-a-porn messages, whether obscene or merely indecent.'
Congress' action did not withstand constitutional scrutiny for
long. In Sable Communications v. FCC,99 the Supreme Court
90. Sheehan, supra note 8, at 358.
91. Id.; Carlin II, 787 F.2d at 856.
92. Carlin I, 787 F.2d at 853; see Sheehan, supra note 8, at 369-72 nn.151-71 and
accompanying text for further information on the proposed blocking systems.
93. Sheehan, supra note 8, at 359.
94. Id. at 359-60.
95. "Beep tone devices require that a beep-tone occur at the beginning of each sexually
explicit recorded message. The customer would have a device installed at [his or her] premises
which would detect the beep-tone and automatically terminate the call" Id. at 360 n.82. For
further information and analysis on beep tone devices, see Peterson, supra note 6, at 2043.
96. Sheehan, supra note 8, at 359-60.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
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invalidated the Telephone Decency Act as it applied to indecent
communications, although the Court upheld it as applied to obscene
communications.' The Court concluded that the total ban imposed
by Congress did not meet the standard of being narrowly drawn to
serve a compelling governmental interest.'1 "Instead, the legislation
had reduced what adults may hear to that which is appropriate for
children in. violation of [adults'] First Amendment free speech
rights."' The Sable holding was subsequently applied, in Action for
Children's Television v. FCC,l03 to strike down similar FCC regulations
in different media: radio and television broadcasting."
After Sable and Action for Children's Television, Congress again
jumped into the fray, this time updating section 223 by adopting the
"Helms Amendment," which required telephone companies to
implement reverse blocking where technically feasible."a The FCC
also got involved by implementing new regulations in response to the
Congressional actions."° The new FCC regulations again set forth
"safe harbor" defenses for providers."" Furthermore, the FCC
"codified the legislature's 'reverse blocking' requirement . . . to
make it clear that the mandatory blocking"° . . . is not an alternate
100. Id. at 117.
101. Id. at 126.
102. Sheehan, supra note 8, at 361.
103. 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1281-82 (1992).
104. The FCC adopted a rule banning all indecent broadcasts, with no "safe harbor"
provisions. See Sheehan, supra note 8, at 362-66. In Action for Children's Television v. FCC, the
court, relying upon Sable, invalidated these regulations under a "strict scrutiny" analysis. See id.;
see also infra notes 115-116 and accompanying text.
105. Sheehan, supra note 8, at 366-67. "Reverse blocking is the process by which a telephone
company will, at its central office, prevent calls from going through to specified exchanges or
numbers unless the customer affirmatively requests access." Id. at 367. Under the Helms
Amendment, reverse blocking was required only in those instances when the telephone company
provided billing and collection services to dial-a-porn companies; it did not apply where the dial-
a-porn providers collected payment directly from the customers via credit card. Id. Furthermore,
"[tielephone companies [were] shield[ed] from prosecution for allowing an individual under
eighteen years of age to gain access to a dial-a-porn message under this statute if they have acted
in good faith in determining whether . . . to block or permit access to a dial-a-porn provider.
Id.
106. Davis, supra note 8, at 642.
107. Id. The regulations contain the following "safe harbor" provisions: A dial-a-porn
provider can avoid liability if it: "(1) [Notifies] the carrier of its services that it offers sexually
explicit messages, (2) [requests] the carrier to specifically identify these calls on the customer's
bill, and (3) [requires] the adult user of the services to pay by credit card, obtain an access code,
or use a descrambler." Sheehan, supra note 8, at 368; see also 47 C.F.R. § 64.201 (1990);
Information Providers Coalition v. FCC, 928 F.2d 866, 871 (9th Cir. 1991).
108. See 47 U.S.C. § 223(c)(Supp. 111990).
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defense to the FCC regulations, but must be complied with in addition
to the FCC regulations unless the dial-a-porn provider engages in
independent billing and collection."'
Shortly after the FCC promulgated these regulations, several
groups challenged the constitutionality of both the Helms Amendment
and the derivative FCC regulations." In Information Providers
Coalition v. FCC,"' the Ninth Circuit focused primarily on the
question of the constitutionality of the reverse-blocking requirement,
holding that the Helms Amendment did not violate the Sable standard
because the regulations were narrowly tailored to fit the compelling
governmental interest of preventing minors from accessing indecent
dial-a-porn messages."
In Dial Information Services Corp. v. Thornburgh,"3 the second
case challenging the Helms Amendment and the related FCC
regulations, the Second Circuit held that the Amendment and
regulations did not violate the Sable least restrictive means test. 14
Thus, both the Second and Ninth Circuits have held that the
regulatory scheme of the Helms Amendment and concomitant FCC
regulations comport with First Amendment requirements.
These decisions illustrate the courts' willingness to articulate a
standard that provides less-than-absolute protection for producers and
consumers of communications that may be considered indecent. In
applying First Amendment "strict scrutiny" analyses, courts are willing
to uphold the validity of content-based restrictions when the
government can articulate the compelling governmental interest of
protecting minors. 5 Under this prong of strict scrutiny, courts engage
109. Sheehan, supra note 8, at 368. If the provider does engage in independent billing and
collections, it is not subject to the reverse blocking requirement. See supra note 8; Sheehan, supra
note 8, at 368; see also 47 U.S.C. § 223(c) (Supp. 111990).
110. Davis, supra note 8, at 642-43.
111. 928 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1991).
112. Id. at 879.
113. 938 F.2d 1535 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1072 (1992).
114. Id. at 1541-43.
115. This is not the same "strict scrutiny" as is applied in equal protection analysis. As
Professor Gerald Gunther has observed, equal protection "strict scrutiny" is more appropriately
characterized as "fatal" scrutiny, since "true" strict scrutiny will almost inevitably lead to the
invalidation of a challenged statute. See Gerald Gunther, Foreward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8
(1972).
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in an elevated scrutiny balancing test, with the balance tilted heavily,
but not conclusively, towards the protection of communications. 116
C. Pornography as Prostitution Cases
Anti-obscenity laws, though popular at present, are not the only
available method for restricting and punishing purveyors of
pornography. It has also been common for zoning laws, anti-nuisance
laws, and even prostitution, pimping, and pandering statutes to be
applied to pornographers." 7 While the nuisance and zoning laws may
still be applied to pornography transmitted through advanced
communications media, the nature of the new technologies will likely
diminish the usefulness of those laws in the war on pornography."8
Prostitution, pimping, and pandering laws, on the other hand, will
remain logical weapons in the cyber-porn battle. 1" 9
Prostitution laws may apply because their language is generally
basic, straightforward, and relevant to the field of commercial
pornography.' ° Most prostitution statutes, for instance, generally
116, But see Sheehan, supra note 8, at 378-80. While Sheehan concludes that Sable (and its
progeny) employed and established a strict scrutiny test, she seems to rely almost entirely upon
the language the court employed (compelling interests/least restrictive means), rather than
focusing on the results or even the actual analysis applied by the court. Had the Sable court
applied a rigid strict scrutiny analysis, the government regulations (e.g., the Helms Amendment)
would likely not have survived because less burdensome alternatives, such as voluntary blocking
and parental supervision, were available.
117. See Hutchins, supra note 33, at 978-94.
118. While it may be possible to zone out of existence a pornographic book store or movie
arcade, it makes less sense, and likely will be far more difficult, to zone out of existence a
pornography producer who is working the Internet. The traditional concern of zoning, i.e.,
quality and appropriate use of neighborhoods, is much less relevant when one cannot clearly tell,
without undertaking extensive research, exactly who the pornography producer is, and exactly
why the use is inappropriate for a given locale. A similar logic applies to nuisance law: while a
porn theatre may be a nuisance in a residential neighborhood, in part because it may bring seedy
characters into that neighborhood, cyber-porn keeps them at home.
119. See Hutchins, supra note 33, at 988-89; Bruce, supra note 48, at 134; Loewy, supra note
41, at 478.
120. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 266e (West 1988). The California statute provides in
relevant part: "Every person who purchases, or pays any money or other valuable thing for, any
person for the purpose of prostitution as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 647 . . . is guilty
of a felony." Id. California Penal Code section 647(b) defines prostitution broadly to include
"any lewd act between persons for money or other consideration." CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(b)
(West 1988 & Supp. 1996). New York's statute states simply that "[a] person is guilty of
prostitution when such person engages or agrees or offers to engage in sexual conduct with
another person in return for a fee." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.00 (1995). Relevant sections of
Oregon's statute provide as follows:
(1) "Place of prostitution" means any place where prostitution is practiced.
(2) "Prostitute" means a male or female person who engages in sexual conduct or
make it a crime to pay someone to engage in an act of sex." There is
no requirement of physical contact between the customer and the
prostitute.' Further, there is generally no explicit requirement of
physical proximity between customer and prostitute,23 or temporal
proximity between the act requested and payment.
These statutes are likely to have tremendous relevance to the
hybrid kind of dial-a-porn that the new technologies make feasible.
Under traditional (audio only) dial-a-porn, a customer may request
that a performer engage in a particular sex act for money, and may
even believe that the performer is engaging in that particular sex act.
The customer, nevertheless, lacks a method for verifying authenticity.
It is left entirely to the caller's imagination. A video phone
communication removes such limitations. A video phone customer
could, in theory, call a dial-a-porn service that offers live interactive
video fantasies, and request that performers engage in particular
sexual acts in exchange for payment by credit card.' t If the performers
actually perform the sex acts, this situation would fit within the
sexual contact for a fee ....
(4) "Sexual conduct" means sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse.
(5) "Sexual contact" means any touching of the sexual organs or other intimate parts
of a person not married to the actor for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual
desires of either party.
OR. REV. STAT. § 167.002 (1995).
Oregon law further provides that:
(1) A person commits the crime of promoting prostitution if, with intent to promote
prostitution, he knowingly:
(a) Owns, controls, manages, supervises or otherwise maintains a place of
prostitution or a prostitution enterprise; or . . .
(d) Engages in any conduct that institutes, aids or facilitates an act or enterprise of
prostitution.
OR. REV. STAT. § 162.012.
121. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.00.
122. California Penal Code section 647(b), for instance, provides that:
A person agrees to engage in an act of prostitution when, with specific intent to so
engage, he or she manifests an acceptance of an offer or solicitation to so engage,
regardless of whether the offer or solicitation was made by a person who also possessed
the specific intent to engage in prostitution. No agreement to engage in an act of
prostitution shall constitute a violation of this subdivision unless some act, in adiition to
the agreement, is done within this state in furtherance of the commission of an act of
prostitution by the person agreeing to engage in that act.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 647 (b) (West 1988 & Supp. 1996).
123. See supra notes 120-122; see also FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL
ENQUIRY 178-88 (1982).
124. See supra note 35.
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proscriptions of many of the prostitution statutes.' Even if the
performers do not perform, this might amount to solicitation of
prostitution.' Furthermore, the persons who run the services may be
guilty of pimping and pandering.'
If this sounds far-fetched, it should not. Numerous cases have
held that individuals who hire actors and actresses to engage in filmed
or photographed sex acts for commercial reproduction can be
prosecuted under state pimping, pandering, and prostitution
statutes1 8 As of the late 1980s, one commentator, Laurie Douglass
Hutchins, espoused this as a positive contribution to the war on
pornography.' If prostitution, pimping, and pandering laws can be
applied to the actions of those who are making pornographic movies,
there is no logical reason why the same laws cannot, and will not,' be
applied to video-phone dial-a-porn and other similar activities that
may be made available via new technologies.1 31
III
Arguments For and Against Aggressive Porn Regulation
As the statutes, regulations, and case law concerning pornography
have developed and proliferated, a raging debate has taken place
concerning whether sexually-oriented communications are receiving
more or less legal protection than that to which they are entitled. This
section will examine some of the basic arguments that commentators
have made-both pro and con-in order to lay the framework for an
analysis of how the legal doctrine applies to the development of new
technologies.
125. For example, performing a sex act for valuable consideration. See supra note 122. Note
also that under such a scenario, the customers and performers may be found to have violated the
prostitution statutes of a given state, and the performers' employer may be found to have
violated the pimping and pandering statutes, even when the employer would have a valid "safe
harbor" defense under section 223(c) because here the customer pays directly by credit card.
126. See generally Hutchins, supra note 33, at 988-94.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 989-94; see, e.g., People v. Fixler, 56 Cal. App. 3d 321 (1976); People ex rel Van
De Kamp v. American Art Enters., Inc., 75 Cal. App. 3d 523 (1977); People v. Kovner, 409
N.Y.S.2d 349 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
129. Hutchins, supra note 33, at 1002.
130. There may, however, be some valid reasons why such laws should not be made
applicable, as this Note will make clear in Section IV.
131. For example, simulated (virtual) sex. See supra note 35.
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A. The Arguments for Stricter Regulation
Arguments for allowing stricter limitations upon the
dissemination of pornographic materials can be broken down into two
broad categories. The first category includes a series of arguments
outlining the positive harm that pornography inflicts upon society.
These arguments share the assumption that because the harm caused
by pornography is so great, pornography should be restricted or
prohibited, and that pornographers-both publishers and
consumers-should be prosecuted and otherwise punished.
The second category consists of arguments outlining
pornography's relative lack of value. While these are not entirely
separate from arguments in category one, the emphasis shifts. Here,
the focus is not on the positive harm, but on the negative good. These
theorists argue not that pornography should be restricted because it is
bad, but that pornography deserves less protection than other forms of
communication because it has no redeeming social value.'
Category one arguments can themselves be broken down into
several sub-categories. While many people agree that pornography is
harmful, they have different reasons for finding it so.
One concern articulated time and again is that pornography leads
to anti-social behavior-to violence and sex crimes. 33 The validity of
the evidence backing such a correlation, however, is hotly contested.'
Furthermore, "[i]f . . .obscenity is speech, the law seems quite clear
that proof of antisocial behavior emanating from it would not [alone]
justify its suppression."'35 Moreover, even if, as some commentators
argue, obscenity is not speech,136 pornography can be either indecent
or obscene, depending upon the community in which it is judged.
There is scant solid evidence showing a clear distinction between the
132. "In struggling with the task of separating proscribable obscenity from protected speech,
the Supreme Court has for more than thirty years inquired whether the material has an
undesirable impact on its audience and whether it has social value." Bruce, supra note 48, at 123.
133. See Loewy, supra note 41, at 472.
134. "In the late 1960's Denmark repealed its pornography laws, thus making sexually
explicit material much more available to the public. In the ensuing years, Danish studies found
that the incidence of sex crimes diminished overall, flatly contradicting the notion that exposure
to pornography leads to increased violence. ... Winkelnan, supra note 41, at 258 (citations
omitted).
135. Loewy, supra note 41, at 472 ("According to Brandenburg v. Ohio, even advocacy to
commit crimes cannot be punished unless it reaches the level of incitement to imminent
illegality.") (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969)).
136. See, e.g., SCHAUER, supra note 123, at 178-80.
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relative societal harm caused by indecency and obscenity.' Thus, the
concern with the societal harm purportedly caused by obscenity seems
to have little logical or empirical justification.1"
Another argument commonly made in favor of supressing
pornography is that it exploits those who engage in the pornographic
sex acts.' This argument, often couched in terms of the exploitation
of women, should apply across gender lines because pornography is
not limited to the exploitation of women.'l In addition, this argument
relates to a traditional rationale behind prostitution laws: the idea that
the laws are designed to protect the prostitutes themselves from
exploitation. Some may see this rationale as being highly paternalistic,
invasive of individual autonomy, and not a compelling state interest.
A third argument, which has gained favor over the past decade,
and which is related to the second argument, is that pornography
represents a form of discrimination against women and thus violates
their civil rights.'4 This argument has been popularized by Katherine
McKinnon and Andrea Dworkin.'42 As previously mentioned,
however, this argument loses force when one examines the diversity of
pornography. Not all pornography exploits women. Therefore, a
generalized approach to regulating pornography that focuses on the
civil rights of women may be seen as overreaching.1 43
A fourth argument for restricting pornography is tied to
traditional nuisance/zoning analysis. Under this approach,
pornography is viewed as a detrimental, blight-inducing influence on
the community.1 ' This argument is supported, to an extent, by
common experience: many communities that house porn emporiums
are subject to urban blight. There are, however, at least two problems
137. It would be virtually impossible to compile such statistics since the definition of
obscenity depends upon the community.
138. See Keller, supra note 35, at 2216-23.
139. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
140. For an exaggerated take on this, see Collins and Skover, supra note 11, at 1389: "In
pornotopia, women porn men, men porn women, women porn women, and men porn men with
equal vengeance. At its pinnacle, the pornographic state is constituted to ensure equality of
eroticized exploitation."
141. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 140; Keller, supra note 35, at 2238; see generally Lynn, supra note 11, at
48-73.
144. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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with this approach: (1) the precise cause is unclear;145 and (2) it has no
relevance to electronically-distributed pornography. 146
The fifth, and perhaps most common, argument against
pornography is that it has a detrimental effect upon children.147 This
argument is compelling when children have ready access to the
medium through which the pornography is distributed, but loses
persuasive force when children's access can be easily restricted
without limiting adult access. 148
A final argument is that pornography, in general, is inconsistent
with the moral climate of American society.'49 This argument is the
most hazy, and in many respects, the most difficult to defend. It relies
primarily upon an assumption that widespread agreement exists about
what is inappropriate for everyone in society, children as well as
adults, to listen, to view, or to read. This view, nevertheless, has its
support amongst legal commentators, such as Frederick Schauer,"'
and more specifically, Ronald Collins and David Skover.ul
Collins and Skover articulate an extreme view on this topic. In a
recent symposium piece entitled The Pornographic State,' 2 they
defined the modern merger of technology and pornography as
"pornotopia,"'' 3 and urged that "[p]ornotopia emerges as the forces of
self-gratification, mass consumerism, and advanced technology merge.
The greater this synergy, the greater is the tendency toward a culture
in which self-gratification replaces self-realization, in which the
irrational consumes the rational, and in which images dominate
discourse."' They further argued that "[t]he Madisonian First
Amendment stands to lose its staying power when it is trivialized,
marginalized, and eroticized by a mass commercial entertainment
culture wed to self-gratification, particularly pornographic
gratification."' 55 They argue that this is so, at least in part, because
"[i]n pornotopia, people are intoxicated with their First Amendment
145. Does the blight bring pornography or does the pornography cause the blight?
146. See The Message in the Medium, supra note 10, at 1095.
147. Id.; see also Davis, supra note 8, at 622-23 nn. 3-7 and accompanying text.
148. See The Message in the Medium, supra note 10, at 1094-95.
149. See generally Collins & Skover, supra note 11.
150. See Lynn, supra note 11.
151. See generally Collins & Skover, supra note 11.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1375.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1377 (citation omitted).
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rights."' They further argue that there are far too few "guardians of
the old First Amendment gates"157 to help insure that the concept of
speech is limited so that the "prophylactic of the First Amendment"''
will not be made available to "protect any erotic act or eroticized
object that might stimulate orgasm."'' 9
All of the above can be described as positivist arguments. Each
asserts that pornography should be restricted or prohibited because it
is positively bad in one respect or another.
Still others argue that society should be able to restrict
pornography, not so much because it is positively bad, but because it
does not offer much that is positively good, at least not as an aspect of
free speech. Schauer may be the leading proponent of this view. 60
Schauer has argued that obscene pornography deserves no
constitutional protection under a "free speech principle" because
pornography is not really speech at all-in fact, it is nothing more than
the equivalent of a rubber sex aid such as a dildo. 6' Schauer is not
entirely willing to deny that pornography may be entitled to some
protection under some theory, such as privacy or individual
autonomy;' 2 his argument is merely that such imagery is unprotected
as speech because it goes beyond the protections provided by the First
Amendment. 16
B. The Arguments for Less-Strict Regulation
Many of the arguments in opposition to stricter regulations on
pornography directly counter the arguments outlined above. For
example, the argument that pornography leads to antisocial behavior
is often rebutted by evidence that strong anti-pornography laws do not
correlate to a reduction of antisocial behavior. 164
Others rebut the feminist anti-pornography stance by arguing that
the McKinnon/Dworkin perspective "denies women any role in the
social construction of their own or of men's sexuality. Women's
156. Id. at 1382 (citation omitted).
157. Id. at 1392.
158. Id. at 1394.
159. Id.
160. See generally SCHAUER, supra note 123.
161. Id. at 181.
162. Id. at 184.
163. Id.
164. See, e.g., supra note 134.
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sexuality is constructed for them [by McKinnon and Dworkin] by an
invisible hand." 165
Additionally, others argue that indecent, and even obscene,
speech is protected communication under the First Amendment.
Barry W. Lynn has urged that "[t]he Supreme Court['s] . . .
assumption that 'obscenity' contains no useful ideas and has virtually
no social value . . . [and] [t]he underlying presupposition that there
is a difference between sexually-oriented speech and all other kinds of
speech is completely unwarranted.' 166 Lynn states that "sexually-
explicit material fulfills the traditional functions of speech:
transmitting ideas, promoting self-realization, and serving as a 'safety
valve' for both the speaker and the audience."167 Accordingly,
pornography serves several functions that should be protected, like
other forms of communication, under the First Amendment. It
performs an educational function,"6 a lifestyle-advocating function,'
a social and political speech function,"7 a "self-realization" or "self-
fulfillment" function,171 as well as a fantasy-fulfillment or "safety-
valve" function. 2 Lynn concludes that the only real distinction
between pornography and other forms of communication is that
"[p]ornography is always about sexuality, and discussion of sexuality
makes many people particularly uncomfortable.""
Finally, it can be argued that modern communications media may
simply have marginalized the relevance of national, state, and local
pornography regulation. With a deregulated communications industry,
and the advent and growth of international interaction through
cyberspace, even national regulations are likely to be highly ineffective
at best, and exceedingly intrusive at worst. 74
165. Keller, supra note 35, at 2229-30.
166. Lynn, supra note 11, at 48.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 49.
170. Id. at 49-50.
171. Id. at 51.
172. Id. at 53-55.
173. Id. at 57.
174. Given the development of new technologies, the Miller "community standards"
doctrine seems particularly dated. The Miller standard is no longer capable of dealing with the
dominant technological communications flora. While it may have made sense when the dominant
means of distributing pornography was through books and magazines, the standard, like a pig in
a parlor, seems out of place in the brave new cyber-world.
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The New Technologies-Freeing the Pig from the Parlor
A. Applying a Nuisance Approach to the New Technologies
The traditional approach to regulating pornography has been a
nuisance or balancing approach. On one side of the ledger-the side
disfavoring restrictions-lie the interests of privacy, autonomy, and
the communicative freedoms associated with the First Amendment.
On the other side-the side favoring censorship-lie the moral and
aesthetic interests of the society at large, with particular emphasis on
the welfare of minors. The guiding principle behind the jurisprudence
in this area has been the notion that, while indecent speech deserves
some constitutional protection, we must keep the "pig out of the
parlor."
While some commentators have persuasively argued that First
Amendment analysis should be identical regardless of publishing
medium,'5 it is important to recognize the obvious: different media
present differing problems vis-A-vis pornography, and may, therefore,
require different practical approaches when it comes to protecting the
moral and aesthetic interests of the society at large.176 The
pervasiveness of the communications medium is one characteristic that
has received particular attention when courts have attempted to
determine the appropriate level of First Amendment protections to
grant. 7' Such a focus makes good sense. While printed materials
containing pornography, for instance, can be fairly effectively
restricted based on age-based classifications, such restrictions do not
work as well when the medium of dissemination is network
television.178
The new technologies, however, offer at least a partial "built-in"
solution to the "problem" of pornography, primarily because of the
level of control the consumer retains.179 Thus, the traditional nuisance
concern presented by pornography-the pig in the parlor-is
minimized-or even neutralized. All that truly remains to weigh
against the privacy and autonomy interests of consumers are the
general concerns with morality espoused by commentators such as
175. See, e.g., Corn-Revere, supra note 1, at 345.
176. See The Message in the Medium, supra note 10, at 1093-95.
177. Id. at 1094.
178. Id.
179. See supra notes 17-28 and accompanying text.
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Collins and Skover. But while Collins and Skover, and others like
them, have clearly articulated a generalized, emotional and moral
fear' ° of the "pornotopic" society, their analysis fails to clearly
illustrate just what the actual harm of "pornotopia" is. Perhaps more
importantly, they fail to show what the appropriate remedies are and
how those remedies can be imposed without seriously impinging upon
First Amendment rights, as well as privacy and autonomy interests.
The Collins and Skover analysis is, to be fair, highly accurate in at
least one respect: the supply of pornography is predicated upon the
demand for pornography."8 But if their approach is to hold sway, the
probable result is not a reduction in demand, but rather a suppression
of open outlets for that demand, which will likely drive the demand
underground. It will also likely lead to the further persecution of
consumers who engage in victimless crimes. While such a result may
viscerally satisfy many, its dangers outweigh its benefits, for it will
likely have a chilling effect on speech and will certainly invade the
privacy and autonomy interests of individuals. Such an approach
would be akin to "burn[ing] the house to roast the pig."1"
Furthermore, while it may be legally possible to extend, for
example, the prostitution laws to cover the new technologies, logically
this would make little sense. A simple hypothetical will illustrate this
point.
Picture a video phone dial-a-porn service in which the actors
engage in sex acts which are requested and viewed by customers who
pay for these services by credit card."8 As Hutchins' work points out,
it may be possible to prosecute both the actors and the caller under
prostitution, pimping, and pandering statutes.184 Now, add a twist: the
actors, but not the callers, are located in a county in Nevada where
prostitution is legal, and the callers reach them via a nationwide "900"
video phone line. Since the actors are in a locale where prostitution is
180. The fear is apparently a fear of masturbation. See Lynn, supra note 11, at 58. It should
also be pointed out that such a fear of masturbation, and the cause and effect correlation
between pornography and masturbation that is expressed both by Collins and Skover as well as
by Schauer, is at least somewhat irrational. Anyone who has ever paid an extended visit to the
zoo, particularly the primate cages, can by experience attest to the irrationality. Apes masturbate
quite freely without the aid of pornography. That raises the question: Which came first,
pornotopia or pornography?
181. Collins and Skover, supra note 11, at 1378-79, 1382-83.
182. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
183. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. This may well represent the future archetype
of Collins and Skover's "pornotopia."
184. See supra notes 117-131 and accompanying text.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 18:869
VIRTUAL PROSTITUTION
legal,"s the actors may not be charged with violating state prostitution
laws. The consumer, however, may be found guilty of engaging in
prostitution, or at least solicitation of prostitution, particularly if he or
she is located in a state with a broadly worded statute."s Not only may
the consumer be prosecuted for what traditionally has been
considered a victimless crime, but he or she may be prosecuted for
engaging in a sex act which is not illegal where the physical act was
committed.""
It is neither logical nor necessary to stretch our legal doctrine to
such an extreme. When one examines the core values that we are
attempting to protect,188 the traditional approach to pornography-the
nuisance approach-is infinitely more sensible. If the nuisance
approach, recently applied in the Carlin trilogy"s and Sable,190 were
applied to the new technologies, the interests of individual privacy,
autonomy, and free expression would have to be balanced against the
"moral" interests of the society at large, and particular attention
would have to be paid to the issues of pervasiveness and control.
Given that the new technologies can so effectively keep the "pig out of
the parlor," courts would be compelled to limit rather than expand
restrictions on pornography.
B. The Nuisance Approach and the CDA
The CDA represents the most recent attempt by the federal
government to regulate obscenity and indecency content which is
disseminated via the telecommunications lines. 9 It has already been
successfully challenged on constitutional grounds in the federal
courts,192 and its validity will likely be decided by the Supreme
185. See Hutchins, supra note 33, at 996.
186. See supra notes 120-122 and accompanying text.
187. This would be akin to prosecuting Bill Clinton for smoking (but not inhaling) marijuana
while he was at Oxford. (It was, after all, according to the President, merely a "virtual" puff.) The
key point is that he was in a jurisdiction where such a puff was not illegal.
188. See, e.g., Corn-Revere, supra note 1, at 340-45.
189. See Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 749 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1984) (Carlin 1); Carlin
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 787 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1986)(Carlin If); Carlin Communications,
Inc. v. FCC, 837 F.2d 546 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 924 (1988)(Carlin III).
190. See Sable Communications v. FCC 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
191. At the time this Note was completed, the CDA had just been signed into law. Thus, I
will not attempt to comprehensively analyze the CDA, leaving that task to future commentators.
Instead, this Note narrowly focuses on how the CDA fits within the traditional nuisance concerns
as outlined in Sable, Pacifica, and the Carlin trilogy.
192. See, e.g., Ramon G. McLeod & Reynolds Holding, Clinton OKs Telecom Overhaul;
Rights Groups File Suit, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 9,1996, at Al ("Moments after the president approved
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Court.1" While it is still too early to speculate as to the CDA's
ultimate constitutional fate, if the courts remain consistent with their
earlier decisions and they continue to emphasize nuisance doctrine,
the Act will most likely be invalidated.' 4
The CDA proscribes "indecent" and "obscene" communications
by use of telecommunications devices.' 5 While indecent
communications are constitutionally protected under the First
Amendment, this fact alone will not invalidate the Act. As Sable,
Pacifica, and the Carlin trilogy make clear, the government can
the [CDA] in a high-tech signing ceremony at the Library of Congress, 20 organizations and
individuals filed a lawsuit [in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
in Philadelphia] ...."). See Reynolds Holding & Ramon G. McLeod, Judge Limits New Law
Curbing Internet Speech, S.F. CHRON, Feb. 16, 1996, at Al. On February 15, 1996, U.S. District
Court Judge Ronald Buckwalter temporarily blocked enforcement of that part of the CDA
pertaining to "indecent materials." Mike Mills & John Schwartz, Judge Blocks On-Line Smut
Law Enforcement; Order Sparks Confusion Over Definition, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 1996, at BI.
Judge Buckwalter, in issuing a temporary restraining order, ruled the law's prohibition of
"indecent" speech to be unconstitutionally vague. See Holding & McLeod supra at Al. On June
11, 1996, the three-judge district panel granted plaintiffs a preliminary injunction against
enforcement of certain provisions of the CDA. American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F.
Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996). The court held that CDA sections 223(a)(1)(B) and 223(a)(2)
were "unconstitutional on their face to the extent that they reach indecency[,]" and that sections
223(d)(1) and 223(d)(2) were also "unconstitutional on their face." Id. Chief Judge Sloviter and
Judge Buckwalter concluded that the law was both unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. See
id. at 855, 856, 858-59; Judge Dalzell concluded that the law was merely overbroad. Id. at 867 n.2,
869-70.
In a separate action, a New York district court ruled on the constitutionality of the CDA.
Shea v. Reno, 1996 930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). The court held the CDA unconstitutionally
overbroad. Id. It disagreed with Judges Sloviter and Buckwalter as to the issue of vagueness. Id.
193. The U.S. Code provides for a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of any
"interlocutorory or permanent injunction in any civil action, suit or proceeding required by any
act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges." 28 U.S.C. § 1253
(1994). That section applies to both the ACLU and Shea actions, since section 561 of the CDA
requires the impaneling of a three judge district court to hear constitutional challenges to the
statute.
194. See generally FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Sable Communications, 492 U.S. 115
(1989); Carlin I, 749 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1984); Carlin II, 787 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1986); Carlin III, 837
F.2d 546 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 388 U.S. 924 (1988).
195. Section 502 of the CDA amends title 47 U.S.C. section 223 in the following manner: it
makes it a felony to "make[,] create[,] or solicit, and ... initiate the transmission of" obscene
and indecent communications through the use of a telecommunications device, where the
initiator has the "intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass another person." 47 U.S.C.A.
§ 223(a)(1)(B) (West 1996). Section 502 also makes it a felony to initiate the transmission of any
obscene or indecent communication "knowing that the recipient of the communications is under
18 years of age:' 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a)(1)(B). Furthermore, Section 502 makes it a felony to use
an "interactive computer service" to send or display to any person under 18 years of age, any
communication "that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs. ... 47 U.S.C.A.
§ 223(a)(1).
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regulate indecent speech to protect minors, so long as the government
selects the least restrictive means of doing so." Thus, the
constitutionality of the CDA is likely to turn on the "least intrusive
means" prong of First Amendment strict scrutiny analysis. "
In order to satisfy the "least restrictive means" test, Congress
included several "defense[s] to prosecution" (safe harbor provisions)
in the CDA.1" Section 502 states that:
It is a defense to a prosecution . . . that a person-
(A) has taken, in good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate
actions under the circumstances to restrict or prevent access by
minors to [a proscribed communication], which may involve any
appropriate measures to restrict minors from such communications,
including any method which is feasible under available technology;
or
(B) has restricted access to such communication by requiring use of
a verified credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult
personal identification number.199
The above safe harbor provisions do not seem to represent the
"least restrictive means" of achieving Congress' goal. They place the
entire burden of protecting minors on the shoulders of the
disseminators of information. No burden is placed upon parents, for
instance, to implement the readily-available blocking schemes
described in this Note to insure that their own children do not have
access to inappropriate materials.
The danger in placing the burden entirely on the disseminator is
readily apparent. Entrepreneurs engaged in the sex trade will easily be
able to protect themselves against prosecution by implementing
blocking strategies. Less-sophisticated individuals who pass along
communications which may be deemed "indecent" may, however, not
be able to protect themselves. Thus, rather than leading to the
prosecution of online, for-profit smut providers, the sanctions of the
law will likely only apply to unsophisticated and not-for-profit users.
Thus, because the CDA does not employ the least restrictive
means, the courts should strike it down. Furthermore, such a holding is
consisistent with traditional nuisance analysis because no real nuisance
196. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 126.
197. The Act has also been challenged on the grounds that it is unconstitutionally vague. See
Mills & Schwartz, supra note 192, at B1. This was the primary focus of the Shea decision. See
Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 22-30. See also ACLUat 34-36.
198. See CDA § 502, 47 U.S.C.A. § 223 (West 1996).
199. Id.
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exists if individuals can easily shield themselves from communications
that they deem offensive or indecent."
Aside from its constitutional infirmities, the CDA can also be
criticized on a more practical level. One of the biggest practical
problems with the Act is that it continues the Miller fallacy that
obscenity is appropriately defined at the local level. Given the
international scope of new technologies, it is high time to work
towards a national-or even an international-standard for defining
obscenity. Additionally, the CDA fails to resolve the problem that
individuals can be prosecuted under state pimping, pandering, and
prostitution laws by engaging in "virtual sex" over the
telecommunications lines." 1
V
Conclusion
The big advantage offered by new technologies in relation to
pornography is that they allow for a more effective balance between
moral concerns and the interests of privacy, autonomy, and free
expression. The nuisance aspects of pornography can be minimized,
while privacy and autonomy can be maximized. While one's neighbors
may not approve of what that individual views in the privacy of his or
her home, at least the neighborhood's aesthetics and property values
will not be damaged by the presence of a porn emporium. Further, the
neighbor's children will not be compelled to watch any programming
the neighbor feels is inappropriate. New technologies will allow the
viewers to select their own programming options, while leaving others
free to select an entirely different set of options. Rather than being
''pervasive" in the traditional sense of radio or network television
broadcasts, new technologies will be point-to-point, much like the
telephone. While many may not approve of the fact that individuals
are engaging in virtual sex over the telecommunications lines, they will
not be exposed to the material unless they proactively choose to be.
200. Judge Dalzell in ACLU recognized this when he stated, "any content-based regulation
of the internet, no matter how benign the purpose, could burn the global village to roast the pig."
ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 824, 843.
201. See supra notes 183-187 and accompanying text. Although this problem could be solved
through federal legislation with reasonable safe-harbor provisions and strong preemption, the
CDA contains neither.
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